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Abstract In his work, Horgan argues for the compatibilism of agency, mental
state-causation, and physical causal-closure. We generally assume a causally closed
physical world that seems to exclude agency in the sense of mental state-causation
in addition to physical causation. However, Horgan argues for an account of agency
that satisfies the experience of our own as acting persons and that is compatible with
physical causal-closure. Mental properties are causal properties but not identical
with physical properties because there are different ontological levels. In this
commentary, I shall reconsider the essential issues of this compatibilism (1), focus
on a problem for Horgan’s conception of agent causation that arises from the causal
argument for ontological reductionism (2), and propose to embed Horgan’s con-
ception of agency within a reductionist approach in order to vindicate the
indispensable character of agency (3).
1 Horgan’s Compatibilism
Horgan considers the relationship between agentive experience, mental state-
causation and physical causal-closure. Thereby, he claims the compatibility of
agentive experience with both mental state-causation and physical causal-closure.
Let me briefly sum up the mentioned issues in order to express a common ground.
Mental state-causation means that the behaviour we classify as genuine actions is
caused by certain mental states such as decisions, beliefs, desires, etc. (cf. Horgan’s
abstract). Agentive experience is a certain experience of oneself whenever one acts
intentionally. This agentive experience includes a ‘‘specific purpose’’ and a
‘‘voluntariness’’ of one’s own actions (cf. Horgan’s first section). Physical causal-
closure means that the ‘‘state of the world at any moment in time, insofar as it is
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diachronically determined at all, is diachronically determined by prior physics-level
phenomena, on basis of the fundamental laws of physics’’ (cf. Horgan’s second
section). Against this background, Horgan raises the question whether physical
causal-closure excludes mental state-causation and agency.
In order to argue for these hypotheses being compatible with one another, Horgan
begins with a reconsideration of agency. A vindication of agency requires both the
argument for mental state-causation and the compatibility of mental state-causation
with genuine agency (cf. Horgan’s third section). In this work, Horgan focuses on
the compatibility of mental state-causation with physical causal-closure (the
compatibility of mental state-causation and agency will be considered in two
forthcoming papers of Horgan).
The problem for such a compatibilism can be summed up as follows: Since on
the one hand, the physical domain is causally closed and, on the other hand, mental
property tokens are causal property tokens, it seems to be excluded that mental
property tokens are causal ones in addition to configurations of physical property
tokens. This exclusion problem is considered in detail by Kim (2005, chap. 2). How
can we thus maintain that mental property tokens are not identical with
configurations of physical property tokens? Horgan argues against such a token-
identity in terms of explanations: a causal explanation in mental terms is compatible
with a causal explanation in physical terms because these explanations are situated
at different levels of explanation. There are different true and objective patterns of
counterfactual dependence that do not exclude each other. On this basis, Horgan
concludes that there are different ontological levels. For instance, the causal patterns
from tokens of agency to tokens of certain behaviour are at a different ontological
level compared to the causal patterns that physics considers.
2 Ontological Problems for Horgan’s Compatibilism
Horgan’s contextualist approach in terms of different ontological levels does not
avoid the exclusion problem. My critique of Horgan’s compatibilism proceeds as
follows: First of all, Horgan agrees with the principle of physical causal-closure
(Sect. 4, numbered statement no. 1). Thus, for any physical property token, say p2,
insofar as p2 has a cause, it has a complete physical cause, say p1. Secondly, he
rejects ontological reductionism (Sect. 4, numbered statements no. 2–4). In
summary, mental property tokens are not identical with physical property tokens.
Say, for instance, the mental property token m1 is not identical with its physical
supervenience base p1. Finally, Horgan defends mental to physical causation. This
means that mental property tokens often have physical effects—m1 causes p2 for
instance. As a result of this, either the physical causal-closure is false, or there is
systematic overdetermination. Either p1 is not the complete cause of p2 such that the
causal-closure of the physical domain is false, or, p2 has two sufficient causes—m1
and p1.
Horgan’s approach of contextualisation does not avoid this result. That there are
two levels of explanation—the mental and the physical one—does not imply two
different ontological levels, as Heil points out (2003, chap. 3). From an ontological
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point of view, physical causes are sufficient for any change within the physical state
of the world. Thus, the non-identity of the mental with something physical and the
mental to physical causation lead to systematic overdetermination. If, on the other
hand, physical causes were not sufficient for every change within the physical
domain, the physical causal-closure would be false. Leaving aside systematic
overdetermination, Horgan’s proposed strategy does not lead to an anti-reductionist
compatibilism of mental state-causation and physical causal-closure.
Therefore, taking physical causal-closure and mental state-causation for granted,
ontological reductionism seems to be the only option. In order to avoid
epiphenomenalism with regard to the mental, and in order not to contradict
physical causal-closure (or to claim systematic overdetermination), the identity of
mental property tokens with configurations of physical property tokens is well-
argued. All there is in the world is something physical. In this context, Horgan’s
compatibilism fails to be an ontological alternative to ontological reductionism.
There is no ontological difference between mental property tokens and certain
complex configurations of physical property tokens because they have the same
effects. In this context, the special sciences and physics describe the same entities,
that is, the same configurations of property tokens. Against this background, I shall
consider Horgan’s contextualist approach and compatibilism with regard to theories
and concepts. What is the relationship between different sciences and descriptions if
they describe and explain one and the same entities?
3 Compatibililism of Horgan’s Approach with Epistemological Reductionism
First of all, let me reconsider Horgan’s compatibilism. Horgan’s approach claims
that an antireductionist position is compatible with the causal closure of physics.
The fact that there are different levels of explanations (different counterfactual
dependencies) is, in the last resort, an argument in favour of there being different
ontological levels. However, as outlined in the previous section, there is a strong
argument in favour of ontological reductionism. Thus, any token of an agentive
experience of the behaviour of oneself such as the intentional action to calculate
angles is identical with a certain configuration of physical property tokens. I shall
leave aside epiphenomenalism or overdetermination at this point. Therefore, one
may be inclined to modify Horgan’s position in the following manner: there are two
descriptions of the agentive experience in question—one description in mental
terms and another description in physical terms.
Let me note that, because of multiple realization, mental property types are not
identical with types of configurations of physical property tokens even if any mental
property token is identical with a configuration of physical property tokens.1 To put
it another way, one and the same mental description type is made true by entities
that make true physical descriptions of different types. However, the physical causal
closure implies the following point: even if the concepts of the special sciences are
generally not co-extensional with physical concepts (because of multiple
1 See also Horgan’s own reference (2001).
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realization), any property token of the special sciences can in principle be
sufficiently explained in terms of physics, which provides the most detailed causal
explanations. After all, Horgan agrees with the causal closure of the physical.
Let me recap the most important issues of this commentary in the context of the
current debate on reductionism in order to outline another problem for Horgan’s
contextualist approach. Any mental property token can in principle be reductively
explained in the last resort in terms of physics (cf. Kim 2005, chap. 4; Chalmers
1996, pp. 42–51), but since mental concepts are not co-extensional with physical
concepts, epistemological reductionism seems not to be feasible. This is the anti-
reductionist suggestion of the possibility of multiple realization. However, if the
mental concepts cannot be systematically connected with physical concepts, it is not
intelligible how the mental concepts can bring out salient causal relations among
property tokens in a way that physics cannot bring out. Anti-reductionism based on
the multiple realization argument therefore ends up in eliminativism with respect to
the special sciences (cf. Bickle 1998, especially chaps. 2–4). Theory reduction needs
co-extensional concepts of physics and the special sciences, and, therefore, bi-
conditional bridge-principles (cf. Endicott 1998). To conclude, a vindication of the
scientific quality of concepts about agency hence seems to be only possible if these
concepts are bi-conditionally connected with physical concepts. However, if a
concept of the special sciences is bi-conditionally connected with a physical
concept, the scientific quality of the former concept is vindicated, but it is
dispensable. This is a dilemma any position faces. Does Horgan’s contextualist
approach help?
In his fourth section, Horgan characterises presentational intentional content as
‘‘the kind that accrues to phenomenology directly—apart from whether or not one
has the capacity to articulate this content linguistically and understand what one is
thus articulating’’. He contrasts this with ‘‘the kind of content possessed by such
linguistic articulations, and by the judgments they articulate’’—the judgmental
intentional content. The clue of this distinction is that ‘‘the satisfaction conditions
for presentational agentive intentional content—i.e. for agentive phenomenology—
coincide with certain not-limit case, compatibilist, satisfaction conditions for
judgmental agentive intentional content’’ (italics in the original). To put it another
way, the presentational intentional content is compatible with the physical causal
closure and mental state causation, while the judgmental intentional content is not.
The satisfaction conditions of agentive phenomenology (presentational intentional
content) do not require the falsity of the physical causal closure and mental state
causation. However, as Horgan points out, there is a tendency to reject such a
compatibilism—a mistaken tendency that is based on the failure to distinguish
between presentational and judgmental intentional content: we always tend to use
contextually variable implicit parameters governing the judgmental concept of
freedom that are in fact not compatible with physical causal closure or state
causation. Thus, even if we inquire into the presentational content of agentive
phenomenology, we must not use the implicit parameters of judgmental intentional
content. To conclude, each concept (e.g. of cause, agency, etc.) is governed by
variable implicit semantic parameters, and the judgmental intentional content of
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agency and causation does not affect the presentational content of agentive
experience.
Let me, however, insist on the following issue: either the referents of the
concepts with different implicit semantic parameters are identical, or they are
distinct. Against the background of the second section of this commentary, there is a
strong argument for token-identity. Taking the threat of eliminativism with respect
to the special sciences seriously, Horgan’s approach is not sufficient to explain the
following point: what is the systematic link between presentational and judgmental
intentional content such that the judgmental intentional content is scientifically
explanatory? As far as I can see, the challenge for the philosophy of science is not to
argue for anti-reductionist approaches to the concept of agency in order to vindicate
its indispensable character in explanations, but to establish a reductionist approach
that is compatible with the scientific indispensable character of the concept of
agency. To conclude, in order to justify the scientific quality of the concept of
agency, it has to be systematically linked with, in the last resort, physics that is
causally closed. A general reductionist strategy that proposes such a systematic link
that takes into account multiple realization is outlined in detail in Sachse (2007,
chap. 2). This reductionist approach is not eliminativist, but conservative because it
takes multiple realization not as an anti-reductionist argument, but employs it only
in order to justify the indispensable scientific quality of abstract concepts (cf. Esfeld
and Sachse 2007). Therefore, the reduction of ‘‘agency’’ does not necessarily mean
its elimination or replacement; on the contrary, it can in fact amount to the
vindication of the scientific quality of the concept of agency. In this sense,
reductionism is the only compatibilism of agency and physical causal-closure.
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